THE CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND DEFEAT II

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND DEFEAT

As discussed in the previous paragraphs, in order to make good solid decisions one needs to be well developed in the various fields of knowledge, skills and attitude.  The one part that seems to be a bit unfair, the human design part, is where understanding of human functioning, especially under trying circumstances, needs understanding.  We need to understand the potential shortcomings so as to equip us with an early warning system to proceed with caution.

ENHANCING THE CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND DEFEAT

It is clear that we can do something about our present situation of human related accidents.  We should remind ourselves that many technical problems also start with normal human oversight that could be addressed through the same training programs developed for flight crews.  Any person that forms part of a crew to perform their duty should be involved.  Single crew operations also need to be addressed in the training programs as they also have to communicate with other services and thus form a detached crew to complete an operation safely.  They are also team players.

Knowledge is power.  Knowing how to equip oneself for the ultimate test is something valuable only when action is brought to this concept.  The following areas are identified as areas that need attention in the most practical possible way:

• Knowledge.  We can expand the knowledge base of our crews, or at least ensure that our crews have complete knowledge of their operational environment.  The 6% of accidents found in the research is avoidable and as a contributing factor to the causation of accidents needs our attention.  Knowledge must be expanded as an ongoing process through:

• Continual Learning.  You need to know more about your environment as covered through the five M’s.  It is said that you stop learning when you die and you die when you stop learning.

• Exposure.  The “real thing” is more valuable than any simulation.  We cannot force this kind of exposure, but to operate in tough conditions gives first hand knowledge.  There are tougher routes to fly.  We must expose our crews, under supervision, to all the situations we possibly can without risking the operation.

• Simulation.  The dynamics of an adverse condition is something to be understood.  It is not just the problem facing you, but the total package.  Studies have shown that problems are normally ill-structured and a single cause could have multiple negative results to consider.  Defining the problem still stays the main concern.  Should one be able to define the problem perfectly, its complexity would immediately reduce.

• Testing.  Knowledge on such items as letdown plates and approach procedures also need testing.  Technical knowledge and knowledge of the mission needs to be tested from time to time and in a structured way.

• Skills.  The accident rate of 20% due to skills shortage is something unacceptable in our modern flight environment.  Although we pay a lot of attention to motorised skills, we still need a lot of advancement in the cognitive environment.  We must teach our crews to think, to become innovative and to be able to contain stress to such a level where thinking is still possible.  We must teach our students to pick up the tell-tale signs of when things are starting to go wrong.  The anomalies must trigger cautious behaviour.  In the area of skills, the following should be addressed:

• Simulation.  Simulation of ill-structured situations the crew might face will teach innovation.  To let the crew face the impossible under simulated conditions will lead to thinking far advanced from the normal mundane scenarios used session after session.

• Decision Making Exercises.  Even with all the knowledge of a situation one could still lack logic.  The application of logic is an art and a skill that could be practiced, but demands solid knowledge of the task environment.  Should fewer facts be known in a situation, assumptions need to take the place of those hard facts not available.  The logic of assumptions is a skill that needs development.

• Risk Calculation.  Outcome based decision making requires the ability to predict and allocate a risk factor coupled to a specific decision made.  This is another skill that could be practised under simulated conditions in the class room.

• Communication.  The ability of a crew to communicate freely and relevantly in any situation leads to synergy.  We are reminded that it is not only the language such as English, but it is also the language and knowledge of the medium, machine, management and mission that requires practise.  We must be able to communicate with people and things!

• Cross Training.  A pilot that is technically minded has an advantage of communicating the problem experienced to technical crews.  If both the pilots are technically minded or have a fair knowledge of the technical side of the operation, decision making is immediately enhanced when faced with a technical problem.  However, the technical crew does not understand pilot and cabin crew language.  Cross training is essential not only between cockpit and cabin crew, but also between all the other parties such as operations, ground crew, ATC, management and other relevant role players.  ATC for instance has direct access to the cockpit and can induce stress into this environment due to a lack of CRM training as well as a lack of technical knowledge of the aircraft capabilities under certain operational conditions.

• Attitude.  Poor discipline must be stamped out.  24% causation in non-technical accidents is simply not acceptable.  If poor discipline is the result of human design or human normal functional failure, it could be understood, but when poor discipline is the result of wilfully and deliberately deviating from the norm, action must be taken.  I suggest a tougher approach towards cases where neglect is premeditated or where neglect has no excuse other than sloppy workmanship attributed to an over casual approach.  Discipline is something we demand from our crews, be it air or ground, but when there is a mishap, we tell crews that as long as they own up to the problem we will not prosecute them.  The information is only required to avoid similar accidents in future.  Well, how will we ever stop poor discipline causation if we are merely collecting data with it?  How can we stop bad discipline if we will never discipline those that require discipline?  The following actions are recommended:

• Discipline Culture.  Ill discipline is not OK!  This message must be preached and practised.  This is a top down approach through example of excellent behaviour.

• Train Discipline Behaviour.  Only when we have been tempted to stray from the norms will we find out what it takes to stick to the norms.

• Punitive Action.  If discipline is not appropriately rewarded, positive or negative, your discipline accidents and incidents will never change for the better.  Negative behaviour must not be left alone or ignored.  This is like silent consent.  Discipline needs to be enforced through a disciplined approach.

• Good Relationships.  There must be good relationships between co-workers, air and ground, between management and crews, between support structures and the cockpit.  Good relationships are based on good behaviour, honesty and putting your company first.  After all, it is where you earn your living.

• Human Design.  A whopping 50% of accidents due to our design shortcomings are neither a doomsday call nor a reason to be resigned to the inevitable.  There are clear tell tale signs when we enter into a situation where we are prone to become less functional, rational or effective.  If we understand how we function under stress, we could be taught what the signs are to look out for.  We must learn what triggers a set of events that will lead to disaster.  In most accidents we pick it up in the investigation and we stand in amazement that the set of events did not trigger a different set of behaviour.  We might know enough of human design but we are still short in training these factors to crews under realistic (chaotic adverse conditions preceding an accident) conditions so as to equip them to recognise the symptoms and to react to them.  There are so many facets to human design or human factors involved in the way decisions are made.  The following are but a few highlighted for this particular discussion:

• Individual Stress Behaviour.  Each one of us will have a different capacity to handle stress.  Should we be able to discover the individual’s stress behaviour, we would be able to address possible shortcomings and train to overcome certain anxieties.

• Understand Human Shortcomings.  It is important for crews to understand their own as well as the general human shortcomings in order to recognise the early signs of being sucked into a trap for which our design cannot cater.

• Develop SOP’s.  Where possible SOP’s to govern behaviour under certain stressful conditions should be researched and developed.  These SOP’s would govern human behaviour under certain conditions and not the machine or environment.

• Train Adverse Condition Decision Making.  Crews should be subjected to extraordinary circumstances in which their decision making skills are tested.  Simulations in terms of motorised skills are well defined and tested, but the human mind’s ability to bring order to a chaotic situation is what should be challenged and developed.

• Crew Composition.  If we know our crews better, we would be able to pair complimentary crew.  The ability to partner the most suitable crew is an art that should be developed.  The operational nightmare of attempting such a roster would indeed be more than challenging.  However, one could start with broader spectrum experience versus newcomers.  Known stress behaviour could become criteria in the pairing of crews.  This field is still wide open for research and development to make crew synergy an optimal tool.

CONCLUSION

Even if the research is 50% off the mark, we still have a chance to enhance our chances should we understand the dynamics of our environment.  We must do more research, discover individual behaviour at the next level, develop the ability to understand when we enter into the beginning stages of ineffectiveness, formulate SOP’s to restore some order in the chaos preceding an accident and condition rational thought under extreme stress conditions.  We must not tolerate deviations from the norms and values set by the company and the aviation family.  We have a better chance than the one we are giving ourselves at this moment.

Yes, we will meet resistance, but the challenge is clear.  Either we invest in human development with less stinginess, or we continue to pay the price.  As a paying passenger I would rather be safe than just feel safe.

Safety can manifest itself only through dedicated and diligent action, but never through a façade of non-action talk and written communication.  We must walk the talk and live the vision!